Abstract
Introduction

25
Venture capital has been widely recognized as 26 having an important function in regional economic 27 development (Sapienza, Manigart, & Vermeir, 1996; 28 Saxenian, 1994) . The vital role it plays has helped to 29 encourage interest in venture capital throughout the 30 world (Gupta, 2000) . To date most research on the (Ang, Lee, Lim, Singh, & Tan, 2000;  38 Timmons, 1999; Wang & Sim, 2001) , little is known 39 about Asian venture capital in general, and East Asian 40 venture capital in particular (Bruton, Dattani, Fung, 41 Chow, & Ahlstrom, 1999; Wang & Sim, 2001) . 42 A central argument in much of the research on global 43 business is that firms are embedded in country-specific 44 institutional arrangements (Busenitz, Gomez, cer, 2000; Child, 2000) . These institutions impact the 46 behavior of both individuals and firms in subtle but 47 pervasive ways (Ang et al., 2000; Peng, 2003; Scott, 48 1995 Scott, 48 , 2002 . The institutional differences in countries 49 extend beyond basic differences in culture to funda- 
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WORBUS 150 1-18 50 mental elements of a nation's laws, business norms, and 51 commercial traditions (Kostova, 1997; Orru, Biggart, & 52 Hamilton Peng, 2002) . Institutions are typically 53 situation specific, thus the institutional characteristics 54 of a country are best examined with regard to a specific 55 phenomenon such as the venture capital industry rather 56 than in terms of general arrangements (Busenitz et al., 57 2000; Lowe, 1998; Orru et al., 1997) . system (Chen, 2001; Weidenbaum, 1996 Indonesia  46  189  328  Japan  231  1,786  12,513  Korea  123  409  2,995  Malaysia  20  59  460  Singapore  64  331  5,258  Taiwan  124  356  3,598  Thailand  8  49  15  Vietnam  7  28  258   Total  752  3,701  40,867 Source of data: The 2000 Guide to Venture Capital in Asia, published by The Asian Venture Capital Journal.
3 Sapienza et al. (1996) found strong similarities between the U.S. and European venture capital industry and they are considered together here as the Western venture capital industry. Europe, which in turn can create extensive differences 145 in commercial practice and activity (Boisot & Child, 146 1988 Chen, 2001; Orru et al., 1997; Peng, 2000) .
147
Some have summarized those differences under the 148 heading of Confucian dynamism (Hofstede & Bond, 149 1988 (Scott, 169 1995 (Scott, 169 , 2002 and are examined in turn below.
170
Regulatory elements of institutions represent laws 171 and sanctions that regulate the behavior of firms and 172 individuals (North, 1990 (Scott, 1995) . Financial and commercial 179 rules in East Asia are generally less developed than 180 those of the West, and even when rules are present they 181 are often not as strictly enforced (Backman, 1999;  182 Khanna & Palepu, 1999) . This fact has strong bearing 183 on contracts and corporate governance, key concerns to 184 the venture capitalist (Phan, 2000) . The weakness in (Freidson, 1986; Mezias, 195 1990) . Similarly, an increasing amount of business (Berger & Lickman, 1967; Jepperson, 1991; Scott, 219 2002 (Jepperson, 1991; Low, 2002 (Tsang & Walls, 1998 (Chen, 2001; Weidenbaum, 1996) .
260
The data were gathered using semi-structured inter-261 views, then assembled and coded in a manner broadly 262 consistent with a grounded theory research design 263 (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss 264 & Corbin, 1990 (Daft & Lewin, 291 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989; Lee, 1999 Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; MacMillian, Kulow, & 297 Khoylian, 1988; Sapienza, 1992; Zider, 1998 Europe (e.g., Sapienza et al., 1996) . The findings on follow up (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) . Purposive sampling 318 calls for selecting participants with specific character-319 istics, such as extreme cases, typical cases, significant 320 variation, or politically important cases (Lincoln & 321 Guba, 1985) . The venture capitalists were initially In addition, we also interviewed the founders of four derived from the subjects became negligible (Glaser & 387 Strauss, 1967) . 4 This process is the same as the one 388 used by Fried and Hisrich (1994) when they examined 389 venture capital decision-making in the U.S.
390
In the subsequent interviews with funded firms, the 391 interviewers asked senior managers in those firms the 4 Diesing (1971) argued that six cases often provide such a number; however, in this study, it was felt that the greater number of venture capital interview subjects coupled with follow-up interviews with funded firms and government officials would provide greater validity of the results. More information is available from the authors on the interview protocol used. 6 The interview protocol in Appendix A contains the primary (venture capital) categories used. Key subcategories-constructs that operationalized the primary venture capital action categories such as due diligence, emerged from the data. Additional coded categories illustrating likely institutional effects also emerged. Representative quotes from these categories and their proposed effects are reported in the results section and summarized in Table 2 . Each of these findings will be reviewed in turn. Most venture capitalists agreed they try to get to know the principals of funded firms as part of due diligence process. One venture capitalist added that guanxi was less helpful in securing funding, but it was a necessary part of monitoring the firm. Government officials argued that guanxi was no longer important in securing funding as the business models needed to be attractive, but they did not comment on the monitoring process. partnerships with a fixed life (Sahlman, 1988 (Wang & Sim, 2001) . Thus venture 7 This is particularly true for more mature firms such as those funded in East Asia. The business model and founding team are more critical the earlier the venture is funded. However, as noted previously, most funded businesses in Asia are relatively mature when compared to the U.S. 8 Although Singapore in particular has been working to develop new laws to cover venture and private equity investment, much remains to be done in East Asia terms of getting more laws on the books as well as enforcing them properly. Sometimes laws from other jurisdictions such as California are relied upon for certain deals if local laws are not seen as inadequate. (Fried, Bruton, & Hisrich, 1998; Fried & Hisrich, 657 1992 Rosenstein, 1988; Sapienza, 1992 norms (Broadman, 1999; Low, 2000; Peng, 2000) . 
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As noted, corporate governance is weak in the three 678 regions examined with only limited influence of out-679 side directors (Peng, 2000) . Additionally, the informa- actually pursued (Chen, 2001 (Chen, 2001; Jepperson, 1991; Peng & Heath, 1996 (Bygrave, 1987; Zider, 1998 frameworks (Scott, 1995 (Scott, , 2002 
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